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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
EXTRA-LEGAL MATERIALS AND THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE*
By JOHN S. STRAHORN, JR.t
One of the recent trends in jurisprudence has been functionalism
or the demand that extra-legal considerations be used in developing
rules of law. This idea - that rules of law should be tested by the
ends sought to be served and by the specific materials relevant thereto
- is not only theoretically useful in the judicial and legislative proc-
esses but is more immediately valuable in the juridical process of
writing, teaching, and studying the materials which are persuasive
of judicial decision. Studying book-law in terms of extra-legal con-
siderations leads to increased efficiency in learning. The psycholo-
gists tell us that meaningful material is more easily learned than mean-
ingless. Applying extra-legal considerations to legal materials tends
to make the latter more meaningful.
When we approach the law of evidence in this functional spirit,
we see that the branch of extra-legal learning primarily concerned
therein is psychology. The various rules of evidence in serving their
diverse policies all reflect certain assumptions which have been made
by the judicial or legislative makers of the rules about human psy-
chology. The test to apply to any rule of evidence, either to support
its validity, or to argue for change, or to make for more efficient learn-
ing, is whether the psychological assumption implicit in the instant
rule is a valid one.
Various extant researches have inquired into the psychological
validity of sundry individual rules.' The present writer feels that there
is need for a broad, general inquiry into the problem as a whole which
will not attempt as such to solve the matter of the psychological valid-
ity of any given rule, but which will state the psychological implica-
tions for the whole body of the law of evidence and will group and
classify the rules in terms of similarity of the psychological problem.
The result should be a picture of the law of evidence sketched by a
lawyer for the benefit of a hypothetical psychologist who is interested
in analyzing the rules of evidence psychologically. This seems advis-
able, because it is a matter of applying the psychology to the law,
rather than vice versa. In such a spirit the present article will at-
tempt to state and classify the psychological problems of the law of
* [This article originally appeared in 19311 in the Illinois Law Review, Volume 29, page
800, and is reprinted with the kind permission of their Successor in interest, the North-
western University Law Review.] This article is based upon manuscripts prepared In
1930-31 while the writer was a Sterling Research Fellow in the Yale Law School. The
writer is grateful to Dean Charles E. Clark of the Yale Law School and to Professor
Edward S. Robinson of the Yale Department of Psychology for their helpful criticism given
in connection with the preparation of the original manuscripts.
t Professor of Law, University of Maryland
, Particular examples are the work of Hutchins and Slesinger, who published a series
of nine articles on the psychological basis of the rules of evidence. See Hutchins and
Slesinger, Legal Psychology (1929) 36 Psy. Rev. 13-26, and Hutchins, The Law and the
Psychologists (1927) 16 Yale Rev. (N. S.) 678-690. The remaining articles of this series
will be cited at appropriate places throughout this article. See infra, notes 10, 21, 24, 25,
35, and 37.
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evidence as they appear to one whose training is primarily legal rather
than psychological.
The present objective is to dissect the law of evidence in a func-
tional manner. Much of the execution must be eclectic. Many existent
analyses of the law of evidence have given due recognition to psy-
chological concepts.2 The writer feels that a valid classification in
terms of similarity of the psychological problem would be useful for
purposes of teaching and writing and also would be available for the
incumbents of the judicial and legislative estates if and when they
choose consciously to deal with law functionally.
The rules of evidence may generally be divided into three groups,
called rules of trustworthiness, rules of confusion, and rules of ex-
trinsic policy. The rules of trustworthiness purport to prevent that
error in jury verdicts which might follow from the jury's giving full
credence to evidence which is untrustworthy or inaccurate. The rules
of confusion attempt to prevent that error in jury verdicts which might
follow from the confusing effect upon the jury of certain evidence,
the intrinsic accuracy of which is not in question. The rules of ex-
trinsic policy purport to attain desirable ends not at all concerned with
the validity of jury verdicts.3 .
It is believed that such a classification of the rules is psycholog-
ically valid because they are grouped in terms of the similarity of the
psychological problem. The psychological problem common to all the
rules of trustworthiness is that of the psychology of the witness or
of testimony. The one under the rules of confusion is that of the psy-
chology of the juror or of judgment making. That under the rules of
extrinsic policy is not the psychology either of witness or juror but
rather that of persons in the human relations which are particularly
involved.
Implicit in the first two groups is the theory that the lay juror
is unworthy of being trusted to hear all available evidence and that
the evidence must carefully be filtered before reaching his ears. Thus,
evidence likely to cause him to reach an erroneous verdict, either
because of its intrinsic inaccuracy, or its likelihood of confusing his
judgment on the whole case, must be excluded or its use qualified in
divers ways. The third group does not concern the juror.
THE RULEs OF TRUSTWORTHINESS
The common psychological problem of the rules of trustworthi-
ness is that of the psychology of the witness or of testimony. In deal-
2 While Dean Wigmore's treatise on Evidence (2d ed. 1923) contains invaluable dis-
cussions of sundry phychological phenomena found in the rules of evidence, his analysis
does not purport to follow lines of policy but rather is in terms of the practical form of
application of the rules. It happens, however, that these two forms of classification largely
overlap. For instance, the group of rules involving the conditioning or prophylatlc devices
also have in common the psychological problem of fear. The rules of impeachment have
in common the recognition of the factors indicating subjective untrustworthiness. The
rules of corroboration share at once that peculiar mechanical device and almost all the
surviving rules based on the policy of avoiding motivated totally false accusations.
8 Wigmore, id., at §2175. ". . . those rules which rest -on no purpose of improving the
search after truth, but on the desire to yield to requirements of Extrinsic Policy."
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ing with this the law makes three subsidiary assumptions which fur-
nish the sub-classification. The first is that human utterances gen-
erally are fallible and so much so as to make them unworthy of being
heard by the jury, and that only certain approved types thereof' when
uttered in a certain approved fashion may be safely used. The second
assumption is that certain types of this approved human narration
in all cases and from all witnesses are either more or less than norm-
ally untrustworthy and in such events, respectively, must either be
dealt with more rigorously than ordinary testimony or given higher
standing in court. The third assumption is that the temporary or
permanent personal qualities of the witness may indicate a departure
from normal in the trustworthiness of his testimony. These assump-
tions furnish the headings of general trustworthiness, objective trust-
worthiness, and subjective trustworthiness.
1. General Trustworthiness
The initial assumption of the rules of trustworthiness is that
human utterances generally are too inferior to be considered by a
jury. This general assumption is based on the relative inferiority in
persuasion of human testimony to the production of the very thing
which is the subject of the testimony. Thus there is, first, the question
of the relative merits of real and testimonial evidence. Then there
will be considered the requirements of perception, recollection and
narration and their incidental devices which, in the interests of im-
proving trustworthiness, narrow the field of human utterances which
may be considered testimonially. Finally will be treated the condi-
tioning devices which are applied to this narrow field of narration
and without which not even it is considered sufficiently trustworthy.
(a) Real Evidence
The process of proof in litigation involves persuading a fact-finder
of the existence of certain phenomena, viz., the operative facts. This
may be done by producing the very thing to the fact-finder,5 by pro-
ducing other phenomena which circumstantially tend to prove the
first, or by the narration of human knowledge concerning either of
these. From the standpoint of the form in which evidence appears in
court it is either real or testimonial. From the angle of what is sought
to be proved by either, evidence is of operative facts, circumstantial
facts, and extra-judicial narration.6
I Wigmore, op. cit., 8upra, note 2, at §475: "In short, it is not every human assertion,
as such, that is worth considering as the basis of an inference to the truth of the thing
asserted; but only assertions made under certain conditions - these usually consisting in
the presence of certain personal qualities or circumstances in A - i.e., his testimonial
qualifications."
Or, the fact-finder may be taken to see the thing, as in the case of a "view" where the
jury visits the premises or inspects bulky objects.
0 Examples of the six possible classes of evidence are: (1) Real evidence of an opera-
tive fact - the production of the signed promissory note which is being sued on; (2) Real
evidence of a circumstantial fact - the production of the defendant's pistol, which is
alleged to have been the gun used in the murder; (3) Real evidence of extra-judicial nar-
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Real evidence in itself has no trustworthiness problem.7 It is
naturally superior to testimonial evidence, even when that has been
selected and refined by the requirements next to be considered. All
of the rules of trustworthiness are concerned with minimizing the
relative untrustworthiness of testimonial evidence. The rules of evi-
dence concerned with real evidence are not rules of trustworthiness,
but rather are those of confusion and extrinsic policy, and the require-
ment of authentication."
(b) Perception, Recollection, and Narration
Only certain types of human utterances are thought worthy of
the jury's attention. The psychological assumption is that only that
human narration which represents the recollection of perceived knowl-
edge is sufficiently trustworthy and then only when it is narrated in the
approved manner.
Under these topics of perception, recollection, and narration it is
proposed to consider certain propositions of the law of evidence which
purport to improve the trustworthiness of testimony subject thereto.
These differ from the conditioning devices. The latter are applied
if the opponent of the testimony so demands. The former are applied,
if available, at the behest of the proponent of the testimony. Both
purport to improve the trustworthiness of the testimony. Under the
former we shall see certain devices which either directly improve
perception, recollection, and narration, or persuade the jury of the
superiority of these elements in certain types of testimony.
The fundamental assumption of the fallibility of human testimony
which supports the law's general suspicion of testimonial evidence
and makes the conditioning devices necessary, is that normally there
exist such defects of human perception, recollection, and narration as
to make human testimony inaccurate. The perception of the witness
might have been faulty or incomplete so that the meaning of what
he did observe may be erroneous. The witness may have remembered
too little, or wrongly, to the same end. The manner of his narration
may be such as to convey an inaccurate meaning to the jury.
The essence of the testimonial process is to create for the jury an
idea of what happened. This is done by the witness relating the mean-
ration-the production of an original marriage certificate signed by the officiating minister;
(4) Testimonial evidence of an operative fact - testimony by an eye-witness to the fact of
defendant's firing the fatal shot in a murder; (5) Testimonial evidence of a circumstantial
fact - testimony that an accused defendant had uttered threats against the deceased;
(6) Testimonial evidence as to extra-judicial narration - testimony as to an oral dying
declaration by one who heard it.
I That is, it has no trustworthiness problem in itself. There is always the matter of
the trustworthiness of the evidence offered to authenticate the real evidence, i.e., to show
that the thing proferred has some connection with the instant case, particularly the con-
nection suggested by the proponent. For instance: Is this pistol the defendant's pistol? Is
this his signature to the note sued on?
8Thus the rules against remote and prejudicial evidence, infra, notes 44 and 45, bear
most heavily on real evidence. The dramatic power of real evidence unduly to attract and
prejudice the jury makes it evidence the most susceptible of the application of the rules
seeking to avoid this danger. For an example of a controversy of this sort see People v.
Gillette, 191 N. Y. 107, 83 N. E. 680 (1908), a case which is reputed to have formed the basis
of Theodore Dreiser's book "An American Tragedy".
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ing he has acquired from his perceptual experience with the relevant
fact. The danger of untrustworthiness sought to be guarded against
is that erroneous meaning will be narrated to the jury so that the
meaning created in their minds is invalid.
While we shall treat the testimonial process in terms of the classic
trichotomy of perception, recollection, and narration, yet it must be
emphasized that the psychological problem is more of a unitary one
than that would indicate. It is essentially one of transferring the wit-
ness's meaning to the juror. The witness's own attachment of meaning
may come at any stage of the process, at the instant of perception,
during the intervening time, or upon narration. The division of the
process into the three is merely one of convenience involving a recog-
nition of the separate phenomena of happening of event, intervening
space of time, and ultimate narration of the former.
Perception. The problem of perception, or testimonial knowledge,
is the same as that of the opinion rule. They have the same major psy-
chological basis - that of extrinsic and intrinsic meaning. For it can
be said that that which is testimonial knowledge is admissible under
the opinion rule, and that which the opinion rule forbids is likewise
not testimonial knowledge. That which is forbidden under either
principle is only so much of the witness's meaning as is not intrinsic
to his perceptual experience but rather is consciously attached by
means of an independent process of which he is aware. It is believed
that the intrinsic meaning of a witness, viz., that which the judge from
his consciousness can conceive of as likely to be intrinsic, is trust-
worthy, while consciously attached meaning is not. The capacity of
the witness to attach a given meaning intrinsically is, of course, a
function of his experiential capacity.'
Only that which the witness has personally observed in his own
experience is believed sufficiently credible to be heard by a jury. All
else is too untrustworthy. This requirement appears in two forms,
first, one excluding such testimony as on its face - from the form of
the question or the form of the answer - shows it is not based on the
witness's actual perception, and, second, as a qualifying rule per-
mitting a witness to be cross-examined to find out if his apparent per-
sonal knowledge related on direct examination is really that. Tangible
aspects of this requirement, all concerned with the meaning problem,
include the extent to which one may testify to a phone conversation
with another, the testimony of blind people or others deficient in some
senses, and the matter of whether non-knowledge of the occurrence
of an event is equivalent to knowledge of its non-occurrence.
An incidental matter involved both in the topic of perception and
of recollection is the rule for rehabilitating or corroborating, which
permits the showing of facts not otherwise relevant in order to demon-
strate a greater than usual likelihood that the witness observed with
unusual acuteness or remembered abnormally well the fact to which
he is testifying. This rule, involving as it does the psychological mat-
See Wigmore, op. cit., supra, note 2, at §§650, 651, distinguishing between the separable
phenomena of observation and experiential capacity.
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ters of attention and intent to remember is based on an assumption
that human experience shows that the perception of facts in the pres-
ence of other and stimulating facts tends to make perception more
acute and recollection more certain. Thus the jury are enabled to give
greater credence where that is deserved.
A correlative point which also goes to show the inseparability of
the topics of perception, recollection, and narration is the rule which
permits a witness to be impeached by cross-examination as to his
memory of irrelevant facts in order to discredit his apparently excel-
lent perception and recollection of relevant facts testified to on the
direct examination. The theory, accurate or not, is that he should as
well perceive and remember the one thing as the other."0
Recollection." Recollection, or recall, or memory involves the
intangible step in the testimonial process bridging the gap between
the more tangible propositions of observation of relevant happening
and testimonial narration thereof. The principal legal proposition with
psychological implications is that of refreshing a present recollection.
This is legally closely related to the topic of using a record of a past
recollection which had been prepared or inspected by the witness when
the memory was fresh in his mind. This latter is really one of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule and will be discussed there although
the exigencies of teaching and writing usually call for its treatment
along with present recollection refreshed. 2
Normally a witness would testify to such meaning from his per-
ceptual experience as he could recollect at the time of the narration
and there would be lost to the case that which he could not remember.
Some of this loss of meaning and the incidental untrustworthiness
due to incompletely remembered experience being told the jury is
obviated by the use of stimuli to refresh recollection. These, by bring-
ing out more detail, make the entire narration relatively more trust-
worthy. Thus, when a witness remembers an event but slightly, it is
permitted to exhibit some stimulus, usually a memorandum of the
fact, to his present observation in order to induce more complete re-
call on his part. Unless the memorandum satisfies the stricter rules's
for past recollection recorded, it is not shown to the jury but the wit-
ness himself phrases the meaning and expresses it orally from the
witness stand. There are involved the psychological matters of stimu-
lus, suggestion, and recognition. In refreshing a present recollection,
recognition is secondary to recall, as the witness must himself phrase
the meaning for narration. In the other propositions of the use of
photographs, maps, diagrams, and in past recollection recorded, as we
10 See Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - Memory
(1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 860-873. These authors point out that this assumption of the law
is based upon a discredited "faculty" theory of psychology.
u Ibid.
1On this see Morgan, The Relation Between Hearsay and Preserved Memory (1927)
40 Harv. L. Rev. 71.2-732.
18 Many courts require that, if the memorandum is to be used itself as evidence and as
a record of a past recollection, it must have been prepared by the witness himself or
examined by him while the recollection was fresh In his mind. On the other hand, for
present recollection revived, any stimulus, however informal, which does enable the witness
to testify orally out of his own memory, is frequently permitted.
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shall see, recognition is the primary factor and the recall is only as to
the factors enabling the witness to vouch for the memorandum or
photograph as of the time it was made.14
Narration. Human testimony normally appears in court by the
narration of the witness of such of his perception as he has recollected.
The conditioning devices, next to be discussed, failing which human
testimony is not admissible, are incidents of this, as are the rules
against leading questions and opinions. One problem is whether the
narration shall take the form of uninterrupted narrative by the wit-
ness or of question and answer between counsel and witness. The
question and answer device is more usual although the narrative one
is occasionally used. The voluntary narrative lacks the tendency to
inaccuracy caused by suggestion, but allows meaning to escape the
jury because of the lack of stimuli which might bring out something
perceived and recollected but omitted in narration. It also lacks the
counsel's superior ability to phrase the narration in terms most mean-
ingful for the instant case. All of these virtues are relatively present
in the question and answer type although they are counter-balanced
by the danger of suggestion.
The general defectiveness of human testimony can as much be
blamed on inaccurate narration, i.e., phrasing of meaning, as on in-
accurate observation and memory. There are available certain devices
to use in the direct examination of witnesses which help to improve
narration and to avoid the inaccuracy normally found therein. Thus
the use of models, maps, photographs, diagrams, and records of past
recollection is at once narration in a more efficient and meaningful
manner and, at the same time, avoids many of the possible defects
incidental to faulty observation and memory. While, legally speak-
ing, the photograph or diagram is the narration of the perception of
the maker thereof at the time he made it, or of one who can identify
it at the time he identifies it, as a psychological matter the inquiry is
shifted to his perception, recall, and narration of the process by which
it is made or identified. This type of narration is less subject to normal
defects and its use improves human testimony. On the other hand
the objection to them is much the same as that to leading questions -
they suggest the desired answer. The opposing side, however, is in a
position to check and guard against this.15
(c) The Conditioning Devices
While human testimony, even when it is the narration of recol-
lected, perceived knowledge, is assumed to be too fallible for use by
a jury in its natural state, yet it is still necessary to use it to solve
14 Hutchins and Slesinger, 8upra, note 10 at 867, find that the legal preference of recog-
nition over recall is justified by the psychological proposition -that the former lasts longer
than the latter.
The use of interpreters to acquire the testimony of foreigners and deaf-mutes is, of
course, a matter of narration. Testimony thus secured is subject ,to dangers of untrust-
worthiness but expediency demands that such less trustworthy testimony be exceptionally
used.
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litigation. The law attempts to compromise the untrustworthiness of
human testimony and the need for its use by regulating the manner
of its production through the means of certain conditioning or prophy-
lactic16 or curative devices. These appear in the form of stimuli pre-
sented to the witness at the time of his narration which purport to
improve the trustworthiness of the narration. Some of these are typi-
cally present in all testimony and others may be specifically demanded
by the opponent of the testimony. They are oath, perjury penalty,
sequestration, publicity, confrontation, presence of fact finder, dis-
covery, and cross-examination.
The psychological common denominator of all of them is fear."T
It is believed that the fear stimulus if presented to a witness at the
time of his narration, will sufficiently condition his recall, his attach-
ment of meaning, and his narration so that the latter will be more
accurate than otherwise. These devices present, in turn, the fears of
divine punishment, of human punishment, and of contradiction, either
by one's self, accomplices, opponents, or the general public. These
three fears are respectively fears of the three major agencies of social
control, viz., religion, law, and public opinion.
The fear stimulus is thought to discourage conscious lying as much
as to avoid mistaken transmission of meaning, by stimulating more
careful, accurate, and complete recollection and narration. Trust-
worthiness is equally served by avoiding both lies and mistakes. All
through the rules of trustworthiness there exists this dual policy of
avoiding lying testimony or conscious transmission of erroneous mean-
ing, and of avoiding mistaken or incomplete testimony or unconsci-
ously rendered erroneous meaning.
The oath and the perjury penalty. The requirement of the oath,
which gives form to the correlative disqualifications of atheists, luna-
tics, and children, is traditionally the principal one of the condition-
ing devices which seeks to render human testimony sufficiently trust-
worthy. The technique is to require the witness before testifying to
utter a form of words, the import of which is that he fears Divine
punishment in the event of false or incomplete testimony. It is be-
lieved that this presents the stimulus of fear at the time of narration
and induces trustworthiness. While no particular means are used to
make it obvious that the witness testifies also under the stimulus of
the fear of human punishment involved in being convicted for the
crime of perjury, yet this penalty is sufficiently well known to be con-
sidered present.
11 Dean Wigmore comprehends all these rules, except the device of cross-examination,
under the heading of "prophylatic rules". Wigmore, op. cit., 8upra, note 2 at §1813. He
explains their objective as follows: "Some expedient calculated to supply an antidote or
prophylactic for the supposed weakness or danger inherent in the evidence." One could as
well call them "curative" devices, i.e., they are calculated to cure a defect or disease already
present, i.e., untrustworthiness. The present writer feels that a sounder name psychologic-
ally is "conditioning devices". These devices serve to condition the utterance of the testi-
mony and seek thereby to improve it. The name emphasizes that they function by being
present at the time and place of the narration.
17 See Wigmore, Cases on Evidence (3d ed. 1932) p. 634, for a comparison of the dif-
ferent types of fear found in these devices.
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Sequestration. When there is a group of witnesses for one side
all of whom are expected to testify to the same set of facts, the op-
ponent's counsel may insist that they be required so to testify out of
the presence of each other that those who have not yet testified shall
not hear the testimony of their predecessors. Thus, each witness both
is ignorant of what has been said before and cannot influence what is
to be said by later ones. It is believed that this device prevents a
group of witnesses from framing up a story and testifying to it en
masse, and also obviates suggestion. The psychological stimulus thus
exceptionally available to improve human testimony is the fear of
inconsistency or of contradiction. The fear of different kinds of con-
tradiction is involved in this and the remaining conditioning devices.
Here it is specifically the fear of contradiction by one's fellow wit-
nesses. It is believed that the incidental fear and possibility of public
scorn, contempt, and even a perjury prosecution are as efficacious as
the direct threats of divine and human punishment in inducing trust-
worthiness.
Publicity, confrontation, and narration in presence of fact finder.
The custom of holding civil trials publicly, and the right of a criminal
defendant to a public trial and the right to confront the witnesses
against him are thought to have some significance in improving the
trustworthiness of the testimony thus rendered by presenting to the
witnesses the fear of public scorn and of contradiction by the general
public or by the parties. The possibility of a member of the audience
taking the stand in contradiction of testimony he knows to be false
is thought to condition the testimony of the witness. The psychological
assumption is that one will be more likely to lie in private than in
public, and will be less careful to avoid mistake.
Incidental to publicity of narration is the idea that the fact finder
will get a more trustworthy version of the witness's knowledge if he
hears the narration by the witness directly than if he merely reads
the preserved report of the narration. There are other advantages
in narration in the presence of the fact-finder than that of avoiding
the danger of error in reporting the extra-judicial narration to the
fact finder by the usual methods. In the first place there is the deter-
rent effect upon the witness himself who, because of fear of the judge's
power, may be induced to make his narration more true or more ac-
curate than otherwise. Then the opportunity in the fact finder to
observe the demeanor of the witness and the total appearance of his
narration may give the former a more accurate idea of the witness's
meaning than if he merely reads the typewritten page, intrinsically
accurate though it be.
Discovery. In the cases of the rather narrowly interpreted pro-
cedural devices for forcing an opponent to disclose evidence in advance
of trial, the fear stimulus functions conversely. When the opponent
is forced to disclose evidence, it makes it impossible for him to have
erroneous testimony worked up as a surprise. Thus he is prevented
from being able to offer evidence exceptionally without the fear of
contradiction.
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Cross-examination. The definite legal rules concerning cross-
examination appear elsewhere in this treatment.18 We are presently
interested in it as a general device for improving the trustworthiness
of testimony. This is accomplished by its deterrent influence upon the
direct examination of witnesses by the side calling them and by its
capacity for increasing trustworthiness in its own right. So highly
does the law regard cross-examination that the opponent is entitled
to it as of right and if a witness should die between his direct and his
cross-examination, the former must be stricken from the record.
It is believed that the average witness, when giving his direct
testimony, will be so in fear of contradicting himself when he is cross-
examined that he will be careful to make his direct testimony as ac-
curate as possible. Aside from this, cross-examination aids the cause
of trustworthiness by getting out the entire knowledge of the witness.
On direct examination he may have told only that about which he
was asked and that only favorable to the side calling him. Cross-exami-
nation brings out the entire story and puts his statements on direct
in their true light. A whole story is believed to give the jury a more
accurate idea than a part one.
2. Objective Trustworthiness
We have been concerned with the normal trustworthiness of
human testimony and with the devices available or required to be
used for improving its usual state. Now the discussion will deal with
the abnormal trustworthiness of specific instances of human testimony,
first as indicated by the nature of the testimony itself, or objective
trustworthiness, and then in the ensuing part, as influenced by the
personality of the witness, or subjective trustworthiness. Objective
trustworthiness is further divided into two headings, first, instances
of less than normal trustworthiness, and, second, a recognition of the
greater trustworthiness of certain evidence.
(a) Objectively Lesser Trustworthiness
Three specific rules of evidence, all of them rules of exclusion,
are based on assumptions that the nature of the instant evidence is
such that it is still too untrustworthy although it purports to be recol-
lected knowledge uttered under the influence of the conditioning de-
vices. These are the rules against leading questions, the opinion rule,
and the hearsay rule. All of them can as well be classified as logical
developments of some one or more of the general testimonial require-
ments of perception, recollection, and narration.
Leading questions. It is forbidden to ask a question on the direct
examination of a friendly witness which either calls for a categorical
answer on a material point or suggests the desired answer. This is
permitted on cross-examination, or on the direct examination of chil-
18 Viz., rules concerning (1) leading questions, (2) the type of facts usable to impeach,
(3) the rule against impeaching one's own witness, and (4) the rule concerning the scope
of cross-examination.
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dren, or with actually hostile witnesses, on immaterial points and to
refresh memory. The theory is that a friendly witness will be all too
willing to adopt the phrasing of meaning by the examiner in preference
to his own spontaneous and probably more valid form of narration.
This is thought not likely on cross-examination, or where the witness
is actually hostile. The use of such interrogation with children or to
refresh memory is a compromise of expediency to avoid the loss of
testimonial knowledge otherwise not to be had.
The disadvantage of the leading question where the rule does
apply is in the combined power for untrustworthiness of personal
motivation of the witness and the influence upon him of suggestion.
While they are permitted with children, who are unusually suscepti-
ble to suggestion, yet there is lacking in such cases the usual motiva-
tion of adults and the resulting evidence is probably as trustworthy
as otherwise. The advantages of leading questions result from their
powers for stimulating recollection otherwise lost and for phrasing
narration in terms meaningful for the instant case. The various rami-
fications of the rule present a balancing of the untrustworthy features
of motivation and suggestion against the forces for trustworthiness
of stimulus to recollection and of meaningful narration.
The opinion rule. This rule forbids a witness to state an opinion
about facts in issue or within his knowledge unless either he be an
expert giving an opinion on a point too complicated for the jury or
the use of opinion is the only way in which he can convey his relevant
fact knowledge to the jury. Psychologically this rule is an offshoot of
the requirement of testimonial knowledge. What is permitted in each
case is that a witness may relate to the jury such of the meaning con-
cerning his perceptual experience as is intrinsic thereto. What is for-
bidden is such meaning as is extrinsic or consciously attached by the
witness. The psychological assumption is that the meaning which is
intrinsic and unconsciously attached is the more trustworthy where-
as that which is consciously attached is less trustworthy and must be
rejected. 9 The rule by requiring the witness to break his meaning
down into the smallest meaningful percepts places emphasis upon
analysis rather than upon synthesis. The questions of the units of per-
ception, the whole meaning problem, and the psychological difference
in validity between intrinsic and intentional meaning are here
involved.
The hearsay rule. The rule against hearsay forbids the use of
extra-judicial statements for the purpose of proving the truth of their
content. The rule is primarily a logical application both of the require-
ment of the conditioning devices and of the requirements of percep-
1Wigmore, op. cit., supra, note 2, at §1918, advances the theory that the opinion rule
is one of the rules of confusion, viz., by stating that its function is to exclude supereroga-
tory evidence. He lists it as one of the "simplificative" rules. To be sure, the rule inci-
dentally does avoid the "dead weight" of the witness's opinion, but the same can be said
for all the exclusionary and preferential rules of trustworthiness. The writer is convinced
that analysis of the opinion rule in the light of its relation to the requirement of testi-
monial knowledge and the common psychological conceptions involved in both will disclose
that the real danger in inadmissible opinion is the inaccuracy of consciously attached
meaning and the consequent possibility of the jury's being deceived by hearing erroneous
narration.
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tion, recollection, and narration. Looking at hearsay as the prior nar-
ration of recollected knowledge by the declarant, we see that it is not
made under the beneficient influence of the conditioning devices and
therefore is excluded. Looking at it from the standpoint of the witness
on the stand who is subject to these devices, we see that the fact ulti-
mately sought to be proved, the subject of the utterance, is not the
perceived and recollected knowledge of this witness. Then too, hear-
say has further ills than those merely incidental to normal human
testimony. To allow its use would be to run the risk of two superim-
posed testimonial processes - of defective perception, recollection,
and narration of the fact in question by the extra-judicial declarant,
and then again the same risk for the narration thereof by the witness
now on the stand.2" So we have the hearsay rule or rule against using
extra-judicial utterances testimonially, which, as we shall see, is
famous primarily for its limitations and exceptions and which has
through these channels given rise to much of the law of evidence.
These propositions are (1) hearsay rule inapplicable wherein extra-
judicial utterances are used but not testimonially and so do not raise
a problem of trustworthiness; (2) hearsay rule satisfied, which com-
prehends extra-judicial utterances offered testimonially but accept-
able because actually made under the influence of sufficient of the
conditioning devices; (3) and the hearsay exceptions, which permit
extra-judicial utterances to be offered testimonially because for cause
shown the conditioning devices are dispensed with.
The topic of hearsay rule inapplicable presents a group of situa-
tions wherein it is permitted to offer in evidence proof of extra-judicial
utterances not made under the influence of the conditioning devices
because the statements are not offered as testimonial narration and
hence raise no problem of the trustworthiness of human testimony.
The problem is not a psychological one of trustworthiness but a logical
one of whether the utterance is usable for some other purpose than
testimonial narration. The essential question for allowing the use
of an utterance under this guise is: Can a justification be found for
using it which ignores the question of the trustworthiness of the utter-
ance? The conditioning devices need only be applied to those utter-
ances raising the problem of trustworthiness of human testimony.
The hearsay rule excludes only those utterances offered solely for
testimonial purposes. Under this heading there are admitted opera-
0 There should be considered the extent to which the typical hearsay exceptions repre-
sent situations in which there is likely to be a superiority in the testimonial process of
proving in court the fact of the making of the admissible extra-judicial utterance. This
superiority is likely to be found In the cases of past recollection recorded and business
records because proof of the fact of the utterance can be made by real evidence and there
is no problem of the testimonial process therefor. Government records are possible of
proof by one of three superior forms of evidence, viz., the original, a certified copy, or a
copy used as past recollection recorded. Dying declarations possess the virtues of sim-
plicity of subject matter and likelihood of vivid attention and recollection. For the others
there is no peculiar quality save, possibly, the lack of complexity in the fact uttered which
itself contributes to the intrinsic superiority of the utterance when considered as the nar-
ration of the original declarant. For that matter, when any utterance admissible under a
hearsay exception is made in writing, the danger of error in reproducing it in court is
minimized.
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tive utterances, utterances which are verbal parts of or explanatory
of relevant acts, circumstantial utterances, prior inconsistent state-
ments offered to impeach witnesses, and parties' admissions.2
The topic of hearsay rule satisfied comprehends previous testi-
monial utterances actually made under the possible influence of all
the conditioning devices save utterance in the presence of the immedi-
ate fact-finder. In the instances here collected it is felt that the exigen-
cies of the particular situation rather than any definite psychological
considerations make it advisable to dispense with the increased trust-
worthiness which normally results from narration in the presence of
the immediate fact-finder. In the cases of the hearsay exceptions next
to be treated we shall see that not only is the presence of the fact-
finder dispensed with, but also the remaining conditioning devices,
because of the exceptional guarantee of trustworthiness thought im-
plicit in testimony subject to recognized hearsay exceptions. Under
the present topic there is found the use of deposition testimony, which
is allowed exceptionally in all types of litigation and is the rule for
certain types. The rules for perpetuating or preserving testimony for
future use furnish another example. The classic example is the use of
testimony given in a former trial of the same issues between the
same parties by one who is at the present stage unavailable as a wit-
ness. The required identity of issues and parties assures that there
was ample opportunity to cross-examine the witness in a presently
relevant manner, and, of course, oath and other devices were as much
present as they could be at the instant hearing. The only psychological
problems involve the loss of trustworthiness due to the absence of the
immediate fact-finder at the time of narration, and the danger of
error in reproducing the testimony for his benefit.
(b) Objectively Greater Trustworthiness
We have been discussing three rules excluding testimony of a
particular type likely to be less than normally trustworthy. Now we
look at the other side of the shield and deal with certain rules recog-
nizing the greater trustworthiness of specific kinds of evidence. Thus
in some instances, i.e., the hearsay exceptions, the unusually great
trustworthiness of certain testimony allows for its use even though
it has not been uttered under the conditioning devices. In certain
other cases, viz., the rules of preference, the abnormally greater trust-
a See Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - Conscious-
ness of Guilt (1929) 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 725-740. The writers deal with the extent to which
it is psychologically justifiable to use conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt as evi-
dential of guilt. This proposition does not involve any definite "rule" of evidence but
rather concerns itself with the general proposition of the relevancy of evidence (see infra)
i.e., the extent to which the evidence offered is of assistance in the solution of a disputed
fact issue. Relevancy is, of course, the essential problem for all utterances offered as
"hearsay rule inapplicable" once there is solved the question of whether the type of utter-
ance is narrative or non-narrative. Conduct indicating "consciousness of guilt" and "admis-
sions" are both usable in evidence under the same principle - they are relevant conduct
of persons whose conduct helps to solve the issues of the instant case. The present writer
is unable to agree with Professor Morgan that admissions are allowed under a genuine
exception to the hearsay rule. See Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay
Rule (1921) 30 Yale L. J. 555.
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worthiness of the particular evidence is recognized by rules preferring
it to normally trustworthy evidence. Such rules permit the use of the
latter only if the former is not available.
The hearsay exceptions. Hearsay is rejected because it is testi-
monial narration not in the presence of the conditioning devices. We
have seen how non-testimonial human utterances and certain testi-
monial ones which have been uttered under some of the devices may
be used. Here we see how certain utterances not made under any of
the devices may be considered testimonially either because the type
of utterance is intrinsically superior, so that there is no need for the
conditioning process, or because there is present at the utterance some
stimulus of equal efficacy with the conditioning devices for improving
the trustworthiness of normal human testimony.
Orthodox theory has it that for hearsay to be usable under a genuine
exception there must be both a necessity and a circumstantial guar-
antee of trustworthiness. The question of the necessity is more a mat-
ter of expediency than of psychology. It is recognized that expediency
may call for using testimony actually less trustworthy than human
narration in court but still probably more trustworthy than normal
human narration not properly conditioned. Certain type situations
have, by historical accident, been recognized to the exclusion of others
which, no doubt, possess just as compelling a necessity and circumstan-
tial guarantee.
The circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness present the as-
pect of the hearsay exceptions which has psychological implications.
These have greater or smaller psychological emphasis as one conceives
the import of "circumstantial guarantee." If one thinks of circumstan-
tial guarantee as meaning a positive stimulus to trustworthiness equal
in efficacy to the normal conditioning device, then, no doubt, psycholog-
ical problems of the first order raise their heads. If, on the other hand,
one feels that the true rationale of the hearsay exceptions is not the
presence of a stimulus equal to the conditioning devices, but rather
the absence of the normal likelihood of untrustworthiness in human
narration which makes these devices necessary, the psychological im-
plications are of a slighter nature. The writer feels that there should
be substituted for "circumstantial guarantee" the phrase "intrinsic
superiority. '22 Analysis will disclose that all of the hearsay exceptions
present type situations both possessing unusually favorable condi-
tions for perception, recollection, and narration, the normal defects
of which make the conditioning devices necessary, and, as well, in-
volving the absence of motivation calculated to lead to* falsehood.23
2 The writer feels that the real psychological problem of the hearsay exceptions should
be stated as: "Is the testimony permitted by a given exception of a type calculated to be so
unusually free from those defects of human perception, recollection, and narration as to
make the conditioning devices normally compensating for those defects exceptionally un-
necessary?" rather than as: "Is the psychological assumption that certain external stimuli
present at the time of the utterance are equal in validity to the conditioning devices a
valid one?"
2See Morgan, 8upra, note 12, where, at page 714, Mr. Morgan takes a modified form
of this position and prefaces an outline of the various exceptions with this paragraph:
"As tending to show that in the various exceptions to the hearsay rule the danger is of
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Thus conceived, the circumstantial guarantee as a positive stimulus
seems an afterthought.
Traditionally based on a theory of a "necessity" indicated by the
probable superiority of contemporaneous exclamations or narration
over later testimonial narration in court there are the hearsay excep-
tions for spontaneous exclamations, declarations of physical and mental
condition, and past recollection recorded. Here the necessity and cir-
cumstantial guarantee are practically the same. The spontaneous excla-
mation24 can, of course, be discussed in terms of the effect of a startling
event as a positive stimulus to trustworthiness, but it also happens that
the narration thus admitted is of something likely to have been ob-
served, remembered but for the briefest time, and probably simply nar-
rated. The brevity of the interval as much as the stimulus of the event
indicates absence of motive for falsehood. It is hard to discern any posi-
tive stimulus for trustworthiness in the case of declarations of physical
and mental condition.25 For them it is purely a matter of probable
accurate perception of one's own mental and physical condition, brief
recollection, simple narration, and usual absence of motivation. The
rule for past recollection recorded" also belongs here. When a wit-
ness is allowed to offer a record of his past recollection, which itself
deliberate or inadvertent departure from the perfect perception, memory and narration are
usually not eliminated but merely reduced to a manageable condition, the following sug-
gestions are offered." At page 732, Mr. Morgan suggests that "the rationale of the excep-
tions to the rule excluding hearsay is that the circumstances of the utterance furnish
reasonably adequate information for a satisfactory appraisal of its probative value, and
there is a necessity for its use."
'A See Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - Sponta-
neou8 Ezclamations (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 432-440. The writers point out that the law's
assumption of the truth-producing qualities of a startling event is erroneous and that
narration made under emotional stress is likely to be less, rather than more, trustworthy.
They contend that that which the law rejects, unemotional narration of contemporaneous
perception is actually more trustworthy than that which it accepts, emotionally induced
"spontaneous exclamations". While this is no doubt so, does not analysis of the hearsay
exceptions in terms of intrinsic superiority rather than positive stimulus make this form
of criticism less valid? Is not the objective of this exception the recognition of superior
situations for perception, recollection, and narration, and freedom from motive for falsity?
While little can be said for the superiority of perception in the spontaneous exclamation
cases, yet is not the interval of recollection of the briefest and is not there a likelihood
of accurate narration? For that matter, what of the significance of the legally required
startling event as creating an intent to remember which itself contributes to the superiority
of the testimonial process. Even if we grant the above writers' point that there is a
vestige of untrustworthiness in emotionally induced narration, is it not outweighed by
the advantages of freedom from motivation, intent to remember, brevity of interval recol-
lection and likely accurate and meaningful narration in the presence of the event itself?
Then is not the law's acceptance of startling event and rejection of contemporaneous nar-
ration a matter of accepting that for which a readily applicable rule of thumb is available?
Can we state a rule for all trustworthy contemporaneous narration which will be capable
of hasty application?
' See Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - State of
Mind to Prove an Act (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 283-299; and Hutchins and Slesinger, Some
Observation8 on the Law of Evidence: State of Mind in Is8ue (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 147-
157. These writers apparently chose to analyze the problem of statements of mental con-
dition in iterms of the dichotomy indicated by their titles rather than in terms of the other
one of classing such utterances into testimonial utterances of a mental condition, or a
genuine hearsay exception, and circumstantial utterances indicating the mental state
regardless of the ,truth of the utterance. See Wigmore, op. cit., supra, note 2, at §1715.
2 See Hutchins and Slesinger, supra, note 10, and Morgan, supra, note 12.
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goes to the jury as evidence, it is because it is recognized that narra-
tion made shortly after perception is less subject to testimonial defect
than that made long afterwards in the courtroom. In such a case the
witness substitutes recognition for recollection.
The two major hearsay exceptions for which the necessity is the
unavailability of the witness himself who possesses the desired knowl-
edge are those for dying declarations and declarations against interest.
In a criminal prosecution for homicide it is permitted to offer the utter-
ances of the deceased person concerning the circumstances of the
homicide if he made them under the influence of the expectation of
death. Orthodox theory has it that this expectation of death, the im-
minence of divine punishment for perjury, and the absence of motive
to misrepresent all furnish apt substitutes for the conditioning de-
vices. It must as well be remembered that the subject matter of these
declarations happens to be matter likely to be well observed, briefly
and vividly remembered, and simply narrated. The same can be said
for the exception permitting declarations against pecuniary and pro-
prietary interest, the typical specimen of which is a receipt for money
paid. The circumstantial guarantee is thought to lie in the fact that
one is unlikely to falsify to his own disadvantage. It must as well be
remembered that one has better perceptual knowledge about his own
money and property, is likely to remember it better, and that the type
facts are simple of narration.
Another type of necessity, the inconvenience of producing the
original declarant, furnishes the justification for the use under the
hearsay exceptions for government and business2 7 records of the extra-
judicial utterances of business bookkeepers and government employ-
ees. Orthodox theory has it that the circumstantial guarantee is to be
found in the duty owed the business or governmental employer, in the
likelihood of superior censure for errors, in the habit of making cor-
rect entries, and in the likelihood of correction of errors. It must as
well be remembered that these records possess intrinsic superiority as
they are made by persons whose profession is the making of accurate
observation, recollection, and narration, and who generally have no
motive for falsifying."8
17 The "necessity" for using business records is, traditionally, the death or unavailability
of the entrant. The Model Business Transactions Statute of the Commonwealth Fund
Committee dispenses with this requirement and, to the extent to which it is adopted, it
can be said that the "necessity" is now the inconvenience of producing the original entrant.
For that matter, why should there not be a single statute covering both business and
government records with, perhaps, a separate provision for the typical proof of the latter
by certified copies? Aside from the matter of how to prove the original record in court
the two topics seem to be unitary. Why is not a government record one kept "in the regular
course of a business"? Is not the rationale of both exceptions the fact that the entries are
made by persons whose normal occupation is the making of accurate perception, recollec-
tion, and narration? Is there not for both the same duty to a superior, fear of censure for
mistake, likelihood of disclosure and correction of errors, habit of correct entries, and
absence of motivation for falsehood?
2 The minor hearsay exceptions include pedigree, the attestation of an attesting wit-
ness, certain statements about boundaries, deed-recitals, learned treatises, commercial lists,
affidavits, and statements of voters. See Wigmore, op. cit., supra, note 2, at §§1480-1514,
1562-1626, 1690-1713.
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The rules of preference.29  These rules avail themselves of un-
usually trustworthy evidence by preferring it to evidence which is
but normally trustworthy and forbid the use of the latter if the former
is available. The first is the rule for attesting witnesses. Whenever the
law requires" that the execution of a document be attested by wit-
nesses, it is forbidden to offer other proof concerning its execution
unless the attesting witnesses have already themselves testified or
their testimony be unavailable. The psychological assumption is that
the attesting witnesses' knowledge concerning the execution of the
document will be superior to the knowledge of other and casual wit-
nesses. Attesting witnesses probably do attend the better and recol-
lect the more accurately the facts in question. The psychological prob-
lems fnvolve the superior perception, attention, fixation, intent to
remember, retention, recall, and recognition of the document and its
surrounding facts. The assumption is that all these have been so
superior as to justify insistence on the attester's testimony. The theory
is that a witness designedly provided to acquire testimonial knowledge
will be more trustworthy than one whose testimony is accidental.3 1
The best evidence rule,32 or rule for documentary originals, for-
bids proof of the contents of a document in issue by other evidence
than its appearance itself unless and until the preferred original docu-
ment has either been produced or its absence properly accounted for.
The psychological distinction recognized is simply the difference in
validity between real evidence and testimonial evidence. The rule
is valid if the basic assumption of the normal fallibility of human testi-
mony is proper. The rule merely rejects the less trustworthy testi-
monial evidence in typical recurring situations where real evidence is
readily available.8 8
The rule for verbal completeness prefers the complete contents of
documents and utterances to fragmentary portions. Under the rule,
when one side proves part of an utterance or document, the other side
2 Wigmore, op. cit., supra, note 2, at §1172, uses the phrase "preferential rules" for
certain of these propositions. See ibid §§1329-1357 for a treatment of certain miscellaneous
preferences.
B This is here adopted as the median of three forms the rule has taken at various times
and places: (1) to require the attester in all cases where the instrument is actually attested,
(2) to require him only where the instrument must, by law, be attested, and (3) to require
him only in the case of wills, but not for other instruments which must or may be attested.
See Wigmore, op. cit., supra, note 2, at §§1289-1290.
11 The intrinsic superiority of the testimonial process in the case of attesting witnesses
receives a dual recognition in the law, both by the rule preferring them as witnesses, and
by the hearsay exception which accepts the fact of his signature as the equivalent of
admissible extra-judicial narration to the effect that the obligor or testator did execute
the instrument. See 8upra, note 28.
8 See Wigmore, op. cit., 8upra, note 2, at §1174, for a discussion of the various proposi-
tions subsumed under the alleged "best evidence" principle.
I The so-called "parol evidence rule" (viz., the rule that no evidence can be considered
for the purpose of varying the legal effect of the written part of a transaction in issue
which has achieved and continued valid existence) is not strictly a rule of evidence, but
it is rather a rule of substantive law, determining what facts shall be operative to establish
liability. It is, however, customarily treated in courses and treatises on evidence. It seems
that the best place thus to handle it in a course on evidence is in juxtaposition to the best
evidence rule or rule for documentary originals. There seems to be a definite analogy
between the preference of writings over secondary evidence as a means of proof and the
preference of the parole evidence rule for writings as operative facts.
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is entitled to have the remainder put in evidence. This preference for
totality is based on a theory that more accurate meaning will be had
from an entire unitary utterance of words than from part of it. This
psychological assumption that whole meaning is more accurate than
part meaning is also found present in cross-examination and in re-
freshing recollection.
3. Subjective Trustworthiness
We now treat of those departures from normal in the trustworth-
iness of human testimony which are due to the personality of the wit-
ness rather than the nature of the testimony. As, with one minor ex-
ception, viz., the rehabilitation of impeached witnesses, all these rules
involve less than normal trustworthiness, the classification will be on
a basis of temporary and permanent factors reaching that end. The
nature of the issue, or the relation of the witness to the case is thought
temporarily to influence the trustworthiness of certain witnesses.
Some witnesses are believed to be permanently untrustworthy in all
types of case regardless of their relation to it (sic).
(a) Temporary Personality Factors
The psychological assumption here is that human motivation is
such that persons peculiarly interested in winning certain types of
litigation, or litigation generally, will give less than normally trust-
worthy testimony.
Corroboration. The rules of corroboration purport to recognize
typical situations where it is believed that human experience shows
it to be very likely that the strong motives of the accuser will cause
totally false accusations of criminal or immoral conduct to be made
against himself or others. This topic is one of the few under the rules
of trustworthiness where the primary danger sought to be guarded
against is that of deliberate falsehood and where fear of mistake or
honest inaccuracy is at a minimum. The mechanical device of the
rules of evidence which is used to solve the problem indicates this.
The evidence is neither excluded nor is the jury warned to scale it
down. They are merely told not to consider it at all unless other normal
evidence on some of the points indicates that the story is about an
actual event. The psychological inquiry involves a consideration of
the motives present in the situations which have been recognized by
the rules.
Thus in criminal cases the testimony of an accomplice must be
corroborated. It is believed that there is too much danger of accom-
plices turning "state's evidence" and giving false testimony either in
order to gain the favor of the prosecutor by a convincing story against
the others, or to avoid an unjust conviction and more severe sentence.
The danger of "crank confessions" made either by pathological sub-
jects or by those desiring notoriety is back of the rule that confessions
must be corroborated, at least by other proof of the corpus delicti of
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the crime. The motive to be free of an unhappy marriage is thought
sufficiently strong to make the testimony of parties to divorce cases
necessary of corroboration. Experience is thought to have shown that
accusations of treason are so likely to be vehicles of revenge or politi-
cal oppression that they must be corroborated. Specifically, there is
a constitutional requirement of two separate witnesses. The likelihood
that defeated litigants will be motivated to seek their revenge by
false accusations of perjury explains the rule that such accusations
must be corroborated. The possibility of vengeful or pathological sex
accusations supports a rule in a few jurisdictions requiring their cor-
roboration. The major psychological problem of these rules is motive,
and incidentally present in some is the question of mental disorder. 4
Interest. Rules which are now largely obsolete once assumed that
the motive to win litigation was so destructive of trustworthiness as
to justify the exclusion as witnesses of the parties to the case, the
accused defendant in a criminal prosecution, the spouses 5 of any of
these, and any other interested person who would profit by success.
Today these qualities largely bear only on credibility. The psycholog-
ical assumption, then for exclusion, today for impeachment, was and
is that the temporary mental set induced by the motivation of desire
for success will cause inaccuracy and lying.
A remnant of the interest exclusion that is very prevalent is the
so-called "survivor" or "dead man" statute. This usually provides that
in cases against the estates of dead men 8 the parties shall not testify
as to transactions with the deceased. The theory is that in such in-
stances there is a double psychological indication of untrustworthiness,
first, the normal element of motivation, no longer in its own right
thought sufficient to disqualify, and, second, the additional factor of
a peculiar absence of the normal fear of contradiction. It is felt that
there is too much danger of "trumped up" claims against the estates
of dead men because of the absence of fear of contradiction. Again
we see the fear stimulus, found in the conditioning devices, bearing
on trustworthiness. The question is, however, whether the danger
of untrustworthiness is sufficient to justify the injustice of the
exclusion.
(b) Permanent Personality Factors
Now we deal with those personality factors which indicate that
a witness will give abnormally untrustworthy testimony in all cases,
regardless of the issue or his relation to the case. Certain rules, of
-, The rule requiring two and, in some states, three attesting witnesses to a will is really
a rule of substantive testamentary law fixing the operative facts necessary to create a
valid will. It is not a rule of evidence concerned with the process of proving operative facts.
Certain minor rules deal with the kinds of witnesses required for the proof of certain
issues. They are not treated here. See Wigmore, op. cit., supra, note 2, at §§2078-2093.
5See Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - Family
Relations (1929) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 675-686. The writers are primarily concerned with the
rules of extrinsic policy involving the marital relation and, to a lesser degree with the
matter of impeaching a witness for bias because of the family relations.
w The statutes of this type frequently apply also to testimony about transactions with
persons since insane or otherwise unavailable as witnesses.
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which but few remain in force, have applied the rigorous device of
exclusion to the testimony of those thought entirely untrustworthy.
Others handle witnesses who are relatively more reliable by the milder
device of qualification or impeachment.
Exclusion. 7 The legal rules concerning the testimonial competency
of mental defectives and drunkards are so conveniently vague that the
wealth of psychological material concerned with these qualities has but
little legal relevancy. A witness is not excluded from narrating his
testimonial knowledge for these reasons so long as he is able to com-
prehend the oath, to have perceived and remembered the subject of
his testimony, and to narrate it intelligently. Both here and in connec-
tion with impeachment for these qualties there are relevant such
psychological topics as paramnesia, amnesia, and pathological lying.
The tendency of the law is to allow the jury to judge from the witness's
demeanor whether his mental state is such as to make his testimony
usable. The religious disqualification of atheists and children38 who
are too young to comprehend the nature of an oath is but a logical
development of the too rigid oath requirement of the conditioning
devices. If we postulate that testimony is too fallible for use unless
given under the fear of divine punishment, the absence of such fear is
naturally a ground for exclusion. The erstwhile disqualification of
convicted felons was probably based upon a theory that such persons
were destined for divine punishment anyhow and hence could fear
none further for false testimony. It has now largely been done away
with although it is still a device for impeachment. Occasionally there
is preserved a disqualification for convicted perjurers, who have, per-
haps, manifested relatively more untrustworthiness meriting total
exclusion.
Qualification. Certain qualities which have never formed the basis
of an exclusionary rule and certain others which have may be shown to
the jury to put them on guard against deception. This qualification of
the witness's testimony is accomplished by the process of impeachment,
by his own demeanor on the stand, by quizzing the witness himself,
and by calling other "impeaching" witnesses to testify as to the par-
ticular quality in question. It happens that while the impeachment
process itself serves the policy of trustworthiness, yet all the tangible
rules of evidence concerning it are limitations imposed in the interest
of avoiding jury confusion. Hence the rules of impeachment will form
the first topic under jury confusion, the next heading. At the present
point there will be outlined merely the qualities recognized as capable
of demonstrating untrustworthiness for impeachment.
a See Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - The Com-
petency of Witnesses (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1017-1028. The writers are primarily concerned
with the competency of "infants, mental defectives, and insane persons". They bring out
the significance of intelligence testing In the matter.
a The legal device adopted for handling the question of the competency of children
seems entirely to miss the point of what factors bear on the trustworthiness of children's
testimony. Children are more likely to be subject to suggestion, to testify to imaginary
facts, or to lack the necessary experiential capacity and powers of meaningful narration.
On the other hand they are less likely to be motivated toward inaccurate testimony.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Witnesses may be impeached by showing their temporary person-
ality factors of bias and prejudice or relation to the case. The perma-
nent personality factors of religious belief, infancy, mental disorder,
immoral conduct, and conviction of crime are usable in so far as limited
by the rules of confusion. The psychological problems are about the
same as for the comparable rules of exclusion. Do such qualities bear
on trustworthiness?
There may also be investigated, usually by cross-examination, the
faculties of the witness for giving testimony. Thus his experiential
capacity, the acuteness of his observation, the excellence of his recollec-
tion,"9 and his capacity for narration may be investigated.
The remaining impeachment device is an important one, that for
impeachment by manifested untrustworthiness. If the demeanor of
the witness indicates a sub-normal trustworthiness of his testimony,
the jury are thus guarded against him. On the other hand on cross-
examination he may contradict himself and so intrinsically indicate
a quality for untrustworthiness. Or he may on being questioned to
that end admit making statements previously which are inconsistent
with his testimony. Still again the opponent of his testimony may
offer extrinsic proof that he has made such inconsistent statements
or that he possesses a bad reputation for truth and veracity." Thus
by demeanor, inconsistency in presence of fact-finder, other proven
inconsistency, and by reputation therefor the manifested untrust-
worthiness of the witness himself can be shown the jury to impeach
him. The psychological problem is whether isolated or habitual un-
trustworthiness on other occasions indicates a probability of untrust-
worthiness in the court room."'
When the proponent of an impeached witness is permitted to reha-
bilitate him by calling sustaining witnesses to show that the major one
has a good reputation for truth and veracity, there is presented an in-
stance of the recognition of subjectively superior testimony. The same
thing happens when one is allowed to quiz one's own witness as to his
perception and recollection of irrelevant facts in order to fix the validity
of his narration of relevant ones.
a.See Hutchins and Slesinger, supra, note 10, and the present text matter to which that
footnote is appended.
0 In contrast to impeachment by proof of the prior inconsistent statements of the im-
peached witness himself there is the incidental impeachment which is involved when the
witness is contradicted by the testimony of other witnesses about the same subject matter.
To the extent to which the jury believes the contradicting witness there results an inci-
dental impeachment of the original one. The process of contradiction is subject to limita-
tions somewhat analogous to those imposed on the use of prior inconsistent statements.
See Wigmore, op. cit., aupra, note 2, at §§1000-1002.
,1 Deception tests and "lie-detector" apparatus have not, as yet, received sanction for
court-room use. Should they or the results of their use ever be received for use in trials
the matter could be rationalized as an aspect of the processes of impeachment and rehabili-
tation. If offered by the opponent, the object would be testimonial impeachment. If offered
by the proponent of the suspected witness, rehabilitation would be the purpose. See
McCormick, Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence (1927) 15 Calif. L. Rev. 484-504,
reprinted (1928) 6 Tenn. L. Rev. 108.
[VOL. XV
1955] EXTRA-LEGAL MATERIALS AND LAW OF EVIDENCE 351
THE RULES OF CoNFusIoN
While the rules of confusion, like the rules of trustworthiness,
seek to avoid erroneous jury verdicts, the specific danger sought to
be avoided is that of the jury's becoming confused in making a judg-
ment on the evidence rather than that of their being deceived by in-
dividual items of evidence. There is sought to be avoided error due to
confusion in handling the mass of evidence in the case rather than
error in a detail of the case. The psychological emphasis is on the juror
rather than on the witness. The problem is that of the juror's making
accurate judgments rather than that of the witness's accuracy and
honesty of perception, recollection, and narration. The ultimate ques-
tion is whether the rules of evidence serving this function validly
recognize situations where there is such a great danger of jury con-
fusion and resulting error in verdicts as to justify the exclusion of
trustworthy evidence or the regulation of its use.
In analyzing the rules of confusion it does not seem as feasible
to classify them exactly on a psychological basis as was the case for
the preceding heading of trustworthiness. Rather because certain
rules involve two or more of the divers psychological assumptions
about a juror's reactions, it is proposed to outline the latter at the start
and then to give a cursory summary of the rules of evidence along with
a statement of which psychological propositions seem implicit in them
respectively.
1. The Psychological Assumptions about Jury Confusion
The rules of confusion generally seem predicated on combinations
of four separable assumptions about the psychology of jurors and their
tendencies to become so confused as to reach erroneous verdicts even
though the evidence be trustworthy. These general principles of jury
psychology will here be called those of dead weight, undue attractive-
ness, orderliness, and insolubility.
(a) Dead Weight
The psychological assumption made hereunder is that jury con-
fusion increases as there increases the volume of evidence and the
number of issues to be solved and that jury confusion can be lessened
by any positive step taken to reduce the bulk of the evidence or issues.
As for all these four psychological assumptions, there is little profit
in trying to distinguish between the confusing effect of additional
evidence and additional issues. It is too hard to tell where evidence
leaves off and issues begin. For this particular one the psychological
assumption seems to be that the more material to which one has to
react, the less valid will be one's reaction.
(b) Undue Attractiveness
The psychological assumption here is that experience shows that
certain evidence or certain issues may prove to be so attractive to
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jurors that they will tend to give too much credence to or devote
too much of their attention to them and ignore the other and equally
worthy evidence and issues. Thus it is felt that their concentration
on but part of the case may cause their reaction to the whole case
to be erroneous. The rules of confusion based on this principle pur-
port to avoid this by excluding or minimizing the evidence and issues
calculated to cause this unfortunate result. It is sought to avoid having
jurors decide cases on minor issues while ignoring the major ones.
The psychological phenomenon of differences in attention to the un-
duly and normally attractive elements, respectively, can give form to
discussion of this proposition.
(c) Orderliness
This principle assumes that jury confusion can be lessened by so
arranging and timing the giving of the evidence that the jury's reaction
to the issues and the evidence will be of the greatest efficiency. The
objective of such rules is to make the material as meaningful to the
jury as is possible.
(d) Insolubility
This principle assumes that the presence of an unduly difficult
issue to solve may affect the jury's reaction to all the other issues so
that their total reaction is erroneous.2 The assumption seems to be
that when one is balked by a mental problem, the result is less accurate
than otherwise.
2. The Legal Rules Themselves
(a) The Limitations on the Impeachment Process
The policy of informing the jury of the possible personal un-
trustworthiness of certain witnesses allows proof of the various quali-
ties heretofore set out. As far as trustworthiness is concerned the
rule is to admit any legally recognized quality relevant in this regard.
All of the definite rules of evidence applicable to impeachment are
rules of jury confusion which limit the use of these relevant qualities
because of considerations here appropriate. As the issue of trustworthi-
ness raised by impeaching evidence is on the periphery of the case and
involves matter less essential to be settled than the main issues, the
tendency is to restrict impeachment within narrow limits in order to
avoid the confusion incident to the dead weight, undue attractiveness,
and disorderliness of the impeaching evidence.
Rules restricting impeachment to the intrinsic method. Certain
qualities bearing on credibility can be investigated only by cross-
4 "Insolubility" is connected with other of the psychological principles of jury con-
fusion. In the case of Insoluble issues, but for their artificial solution by presumptions,
there would be a tendency on the part of parties litigant having the general burden of
proof to cumulate second and third hand evidence possibly but not probably capable of
solving the issues in question with the resulting increase in the "dead weight" of the case.
And, for that matter, an Insoluble issue is, perforce, an unduly attractive one.
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examination of the suspected witness. It is forbidden to go farther
into the quality by calling extrinsic impeaching witnesses to testify
about this. This is so for investigations into the witness's faculties
for perception, recollection, and narration, including his experiential
capacity with the subject matter of his testimony, and, occasionally,
his mental condition. It is likewise the rule for impeachment by specific
immoral acts other than conviction of crime. Despite the fact that
contradiction of the witness's denial of immoral conduct would show
whatever untrustworthiness was implicit in the fact and as well show
him up for a specific liar on the witness stand for having denied it, yet
it is believed that the tendency of such extrinsic proof to increase the
dead weight of the evidence and to add unduly attractive issues out-
weighs its value to the cause of trustworthiness. Where the quality
sought to be used is conviction for a crime impairing credibility, proof
of it is allowed by extrinsic evidence, viz., the formal record of convic-
tion. This type of issue is not so likely to be confusing as specific im-
morality generally, either because it is harder to dispute about it, or
it lacks the undue attractiveness of the latter, or because the number
of instances for a given witness is likely to be relatively less. Bias,
corruption, and interest, likewise may be proven extrinsically as they
are hard to prove otherwise.
Avoiding the need for extrinsic proof. The rule - that extrinsic
proof that a witness has made an inconsistent statement is inadmis-
sible unless the witness himself has first been asked concerning it -
purports to avoid the need for such proof and its incidental confusion
of issues by the dead weight of additional evidence, by enabling the
witness either to admit the making of it, or to explain it away, if
possible. This "laying of a foundation" purports to keep down the
amount of evidence and number of issues by making it possible for
the separate issue of whether he did make the statement to be settled
before he leaves the stand.
The type of impeaching evidence. Two rules limit the evidence
Which may be offered to impeach. One is that it is permitted only
to impeach by those prior inconsistent statements which are in them-
selves relevant in the instant case, and not by "collateral" ones. While
an inconsistent statement about an irrelevant matter would as much
show the impeached witness to be a liar as one about a relevant fact,
yet the former is more likely to confuse the jury too much by additional
evidence and strange issues than the latter. The other rule is that
only general reputation for untrustworthiness43 is admissible and not
proof of specific acts of lying. While the former is but a combination
of hearsay and opinion, yet it is preferred to the more trustworthy
latter because the latter tends to raise numerous and confusing issues,
," A correlative rule is the one that limits impeachment by extrinsic proof of reputation
to reputation for truth and veracity and forbids the use of general bad reputation or repu-
tation for other qualities. No doubt one's reputation for drunkenness or sexual immorality,
for example, would prove more "unduly attractive" to a jury and hence more confusing
than one's reputation for truth and veracity. At the same time it is less relevant on the
issue of trustworthiness. See Wigmore, op. cit., supra, note 2, at §§922-923.
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one for each specific lie. For the former there is but one issue, i.e., what
do his neighbors think of him?
Impeaching one's own witness. The rule against impeaching one's
own witness is hard to classify. To a certain extent it can be called a
rule of truthworthiness because it encourages trustworthy testimony
on direct examination by enabling the witness to be free from revenge
for giving true testimony against the side calling him. But it is also
a rule avoiding confusion by enabling the jury to think of all the testi-
mony for the same side as a definite unit and to weigh the one group
of witnesses against the other. While this is a questionable policy, yet
this specific rule, and the impeachment process generally, seem to
encourage this mental process on the part of the jurors in making
judgments.
Rehabilitation. Certain rules limit the rehabilitation of an im-
peached witness. It cannot be shown that he has made prior con-
sistent statements, even if he has been impeached by inconsistent ones.
These former merely show further what has already been shown, viz.,
that he has on separate occasions been inconsistent in his statements.
Nor is it permitted to show that a witness, impeached by record of
criminality, was actually innocent of the crime although it may usually
be shown that he has since reformed. It may also be shown that he has
a good reputation for truth and veracity. These latter do not create
such discernible separate issues.
(b) The Order of Giving Evidence
In making for maximum efficiency in jury verdicts the law pro-
vides a certain order for giving evidence, calculated to cause its pro-
duction in the least confusing manner. It is believed that the best order
for this purpose is to have the moving party call his witnesses in turn,
to quiz them, to allow the opponent to quiz them on cross-examination
with reference to the direct examination while still on the stand for
the first time, and then to allow the process to be reversed for the
opponent. The federal rule about the "scope of cross-examination"
restricts this process to quizzing about the subject matter of the direct
examination only and requires the cross-examiner to wait his turn
and call the same witness among his own witnesses if he wishes to elicit
further information. This is on the theory that the jury is the least con-
fused by having all the evidence for one side as a unit, disturbed only
by cross-quizzing on those facts alone.
(c) Relevancy
The rule that only relevant evidence may be admitted in the case
purports to avoid jury confusion by rejecting additional evidence and
extraneous issues. The policy of "dead weight" is served. The discre-
tionary power of the trial court to reject cumulative evidence does the
same thing. Also serving the policy of avoiding "dead weight" is the
much criticised rule forbidding comparison of disputed handwriting
with any document not otherwise relevant in the case.
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(d) Character, Remote and Prejudicial Evidence
The character rule and the rules against remote and prejudicial
evidence purport to reject trustworthy and relevant evidence because
of its potentialities for confusing the jury by raising additional and
unduly attractive issues. The principle of "undue attractiveness" is
believed to justify the exclusion because of the tendencies of juries to
render their verdicts solely on their reaction to the unduly attractive
evidence or issues rather than on a proper consideration of all the
evidence and issues. Thus it is not permitted normally to show other
crimes by the accused defendant in a criminal case. It is too likely
that the jury will convict him for being a bad man rather than for
doing the instant crime. The peculiarities of the instant case may make
proof of other crimes abnormally relevant and the great demand for
it may outweigh the possibility of confusion. The character rule44 nor-
mally forbids the use of character to prove specific acts. There is too
great a likelihood of the jury's devoting their endeavors to a solution
of the issue of whether the one possesses such character.
Remote evidence45 which is unduly likely to distract a jury and
is only of slight relevance is rejected. So, too, it is with prejudicial
evidence, such as the fact that a damage suit defendant carries liability
insurance. There is too much likelihood of a verdict for plaintiff regard-
less if it be known that defendant will not suffer. Evidence of a liability
policy is believed capable of causing the jury to ignore the main issue
in the case. Through all these rules based on the principles of "dead
weight" and "undue attractiveness", there is seen a balancing of rele-
vancy against confusion. The more relevant and more necessary to the
case the given evidence is, the less likely it is that the probability of
confusion will be allowed to exclude it.
(e) Court Officers
Any rule restricting or regulating the testimony of court officers
in cases in which they are immediately functioning is based on a theory
that their testimony will be unduly attractive to the jury.
(f) Burden of Proof, Presumptions, and Judicial Notice
The rules of burden of proof purport to avoid jury confusion by
providing an orderly manner of conducting litigation and by assigning
to those best calculated to adduce evidence on certain issues the duty
of doing so. Thus under the penalty of not persuading the jury, or of
an unfavorable ruling by the judge, parties possessing the informa-
tion capable of solving an issue are encouraged to submit it. The danger
of confusion due to "insolubility" is thereby lessened. Insolubility can
as much arise from the failure to produce available evidence as from
"See Wigmore, op. cit., supra, note 2, at §8-A, analyzing the character rule in terms
of (1) a rule against traits, and (2) a rule against particular instances of conduct.
0The rule against remote evidence is also subsumed under the names of the rule against
res inter aZio8 acta and the rule against particular Instances of external happenings. Ibid.
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the impossibility of producing any. A rebuttable presumption or per-
missible inference involves the jury's being instructed that they must
or may infer the existence of a fact in issue from the proof of a separate
fact. These exist to avoid jury confusion for two alternative reasons,
one of "dead weight" and the other of "insolubility". It may be that the
fact proven so highly indicates the existence of the fact desired to
be proved that to demand proof of the latter would merely tend to
cumulate the evidence in the case and cause the jury to be confused
by the dead weight thereof. To avoid the possibility of the jury's so
being confused a presumptive rule is established to make the cumula-
tive evidence unnecessary to be proven by the side seeking to establish
the fact. Or certain presumptions may be based upon the consideration
that it is very likely to be utterly impossible to provide evidence nor-
mally solving the issue. Thus it is necessary that the issue be artificially
solved so that the jury will not be confused. Where this is the case,
the law attempts to avoid this insolubility and incident confusion by
solving the issue in advance in terms of evidence normally capable of
being provided. In either event rules of rebuttable presumption or
permissible inference avoid the necessity of the jury's going into
voluminous or insoluble issues unless rebutting evidence calls for this.
When a court takes judicial notice of a fact, it instructs the jury either
that a fact is so or that they are permitted to consider it so. In doing
this it is avoiding the jury confusion that would result from the dead
weight of normal proof of facts not capable of being disputed and for
which normal proof is unnecessary. It is the jury's function to solve
disputed fact issues. To ask them to listen to facts about an issue which
cannot be disputed would confuse them in their true function.
3. The Mechanical Difference in the Devices of the
Rules of Evidence
One of the problems of jury psychology is the psychological dif-
ference in the various devices adopted for achieving the ends of the
sundry rules of evidence, particularly the rules of trustworthiness.
Why is it that the jury is guarded against untrustworthiness of various
kinds by devices of different mechanical nature? Why is some un-
trustworthiness handled by the application of conditioning devices,
other by exclusion or instruction to disregard, and still other by less
rigorous devices such as preference, corroboration, or impeachment of
witnesses. Is the difference a matter of a difference in the relative
trustworthiness of the various classes of untrustworthy evidence or is
it a matter of the relative danger of the jury's being misled by the type
of evidence, if we assume its untrustworthiness to be a constant. The
answer to this involves but another problem of jury psychology. The
rules of trustworthiness themselves thus are seen to make certain
assumptions about the psychology of jurors 6 which is more particu-
"6 That the psychology of jurors is, in the last analysis, the central problem of the
psychology of the law of evidence is seen in a postscript to the Hutchins-Slesinger series of
articles, supra, note 1, which was uttered by President Hutchins in 1933 and published in
1934. See infra, note 52.
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larly the psychological nub of the rules of confusion. There are differ-
ences in the mechanics of the devices found in the rules of confusion
themselves. Some problems are handled by exclusion or instruction
to disregard, others by regulating the order of the proceedings, and
still others by advice of court to jury. In the rules of extrinsic policy
we shall see that the nature of the problem is such that only exclusion,
either absolute or at the will of the person whose interest is being
immediately protected, can effectually serve the policies sought to be
fostered. We shall now discuss the various devices of the rules of
trustworthiness.
The conditioning devices and other incidental propositions sur-
rounding the narration of testimony are expedients calculated to com-
promise the fallibility of human testimony and the need for its use in
litigation. Only when they result in the definite exclusion of available
testimony, is there any problem of weighing in the balance the desire
to serve the policy of the rule against the injustice of depriving parties
litigant of the involved testimony.
The device of exclusion as an abstraction presents but little
problem. If the evidence so excluded is very likely to deceive the
jury, confuse them, or by its publication affect adversely a protected
human relation, there is no doubt but that by its exclusion the jury
is not deceived, nor confused, nor is the relation affected. There is,
of course, a slight possibility of untrustworthiness due to the jury's
giving erroneous meaning to other evidence which they would not
have given had that which was excluded been before them. And the
lack of it may cause some confusion due to the insolubility of some
issue caused thereby. But the major problem is that of weighing in
the balance of the desirability of avoiding untrustworthiness and con-
fusion, or of serving out the extrinsic policy, against the likely injustice
following from the suppression of relevant testimony. And this is more
of a human demand problem than a psychological one once the initial
psychological problem of the probable trustworthiness of the involved
evidence, or of its confusing effect, or its effect on the human relation
has been solved.
In exceptional instances where evidence which should have been
excluded"7 by a rule of exclusion does get into the case and is heard
by the jury, it is customary, rather than to declare a mistrial therefor,
to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence. This presents the
psychological problem of whether it is mentally possible for them to
disregard the evidence they have once heard and which, by legal
hypothesis, they should not have heard.
The devices of the rules of trustworthiness which are less rigor-
ous than exclusion are preference, corroboration, and impeachment.
The rules of preference are rules of temporary exclusion only and can
hardly be said to work any injustice. They merely serve to encour-
47 The device of instruction to disregard is also used to handle the problem of self-
incrimination. In some jurisdictions an accused criminal defendant is entitled to demand
that the judge instruct the jury that they must draw no unfavorable inferences from the
failure of the defendant to become a witness. Is it not futile to give this instruction? Does
It not do more harm than good?
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age the production of more trustworthy evidence and as such pro-
vide little question of jury psychology, which, after the required
evidence has been presented, is a constant matter. The rules of cor-
roboration, likewise, involve but little consideration of jury psychology
because they function at a different level. They are dealt with by the
judge in his function of ascertaining whether there is sufficient evi-
dence to go to the jury or to support a jury verdict actually rendered.
Their consideration by the jury is only incidental. The device of cor-
roboration is peculiarly adapted to the specific danger of untrustworthi-
ness found in the situations where it is used. These situations primarily
involve the danger of total falsehood and but incidentally have any
danger of mistaken error in narration. This device adapts itself well
because if the jury are convinced from non-suspect sources that the
story is probably so, they can then add the otherwise suspected testi-
mony to the total mass in reaching a conclusion. Where the danger is
as much mistake as lying, exclusion or impeachment has been felt to
be the only answer. It would be well if the corroboration device were
substituted for exclusion in other situations where the major danger
is total falsity and where the danger of mistake is but normal. Such a
one would be the "dead man" situation.
The rules of impeachment do involve some considerations of jury
psychology. To what extent is it possible for a jury to be guarded
against untrustworthy testimony by merely being warned of the quality
of the testimony it is permitted to hear? The tendency today is to sub-
stitute impeachment as the device for handling much of the subjective
untrustworthiness, which was at one time handled by exclusion. The
validity of this involves two considerations, first the relative untrust-
worthiness of different types of testimony, and, second the relative
effect different types of testimony of constant trustworthiness will
have on a juror's mind. It may be that one type of untrustworthiness
can efficiently be guarded against by impeachment where another will
demand exclusion. The advance in the intelligence of jurors, indicated
by the spread of universal education, may explain why today much
of untrustworthiness once handled by exclusion is now handled by
impeachment.
THE RUmz OF ExTmNsic PoIacY
Here we deal for the first time with rules not concerned with
the validity of jury verdicts but which rather purport to accomplish
other but nevertheless equally desirable ends. Where for the earlier
groups the psychological problem was that of the witness or of the
juror, here the problem is the psychology of human beings generally
as they perform in the human relations sought to be fostered by
the rules. Three general types of policy, of separate psychological
significance, can be discerned. These are the policies of encouraging
business and social relations, of encouraging the efficient conduct of
governmental affairs, and of protecting persons accused of crime. These
policies are sought to be served either by the absolute exclusion of
evidence the narration of which would injuriously affect these relations,
[VOL. XV
1955] EXTRA-LEGAL MATERIALS AND LAW OF EVIDENCE 359
or by excluding it save upon the permission of the interested person,
viz., by privileging it. It is believed that the injustice of the exclusion
of relevant evidence is outweighed by the desirability of fostering the
involved relation.
1. Business and Social Relations
We have already seen how at one time the law excluded the testi-
mony of a spouse when offered on behalf of a spouse because it was
considered too untrustworthy. Here we shall see how other rules of
evidence concerning the marital relation4 8 are supposed to serve the
extrinsic policy of fostering that relation. Thus at one time it was also
provided that a spouse could not testify against a spouse. It was be-
lieved that if this were permitted marital discord would result. More
frequently today the sole vestige of this is to make the witness spouse
non-compellable in criminal cases but to permit the witness spouse to
testify voluntarily in all cases and to be compelled in civil cases. This
variation probably more closely accords with the policy of avoiding
marital discord. Then by another rule, which still survives, it is for-
bidden to compel or permit a spouse to testify concerning confidential
communications made by the other spouse. This is done on the theory
that making them inadmissible encourages spouses to make confidential
communications to each other more frequently and thus marital happi-
ness will be fostered. The psychological problem is the validity of the
assumption that sufficiently more desirable communications are made
because of the rule to justify the exclusion.4
The same attitude underlying the rule of privileged marital com-
munications is found back of the professional privileges. It is assumed
that the conduct of certain allegedly socially desirable professions will
be improved by rules rendering forever secret any communications
between the parties to the relation and that this secrecy is more desir-
able than that the communications shall be used as evidence. Here,
too, the psychological question is whether people make any more com-
munications because of these rules than otherwise. Thus the law recog-
nizes the attorney-client relation by a privileged communications rule
and so encourages people to seek legal advice. Statutes have occa-
sionally extended it to physician and patient, priest and penitent, and
other socially desirable relations and occupations. The socially desir-
able end of encouraging the compromising of litigation is sought to be
encouraged by a rule which makes inadmissible in evidence against the
offeror the fact of a bona fide offer of compromise of the matter in issue.
2. Government Functions
These rules of evidence seek to encourage the efficient conduct
of government business by excluding or privileging testimony as to
48 See Hutchins and Slesinger, 8upra, note 35.
9 The so-called "Lord Mansfield rule" or "rule against bastardizing the issue" which
forbids the testimony of spouses to prove the illegitimacy of the child of the wife purports
to serve the policies of decency and of fostering marital accord.
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certain things or from certain persons. Thus the head of the state
cannot be compelled to attend court and may testify, if at all, by
deposition. Then, state secrets are privileged and need not be disclosed,
nor may original copies of valuable government records be taken
away. These rules purport to render more efficient the conduct of
government business by the officials themselves.
In order that persons having relevant knowledge concerning the
commission of crime may be encouraged to report that knowledge with-
out fear of vengeance so that the offenders may be apprehended, and
as well to protect those innocently accused from having the rumor
spread, there is a privilege for informer's testimony given to a prosecut-
ing official or before a grand jury. This privilege is subject to exception
when the purpose of the privilege has been served and nothing will
be accomplished by further secrecy, or when an unusual desirability
for using the testimony appears.
In order to encourage free discussion of issues in the jury room,
there is a rule, which in one aspect is called the "rule that no juror
can be heard to impeach his verdict". The rule makes secret and
privileged whatever is said and done in a jury room by a jury while
deliberating their indictment or verdict.
3. Protection of Accused Persons
The underlying theory of these rules is that it is desirable that
prosecuting officials shall bestir themselves to work up cases against
suspected criminals by normal means and shall not be permitted to
rely on unfair and abnormal devices. 0 Thus we have three rules
serving this policy which are the rule excluding evidence obtained
by unconstitutional search and seizure, the rule against self-incrimina-
tion, and the rule excluding involuntary confessions. It is believed
that prosecuting officials will thereby be encouraged to function nor-
mally in working up cases for court and thus public confidence in the
administration of justice will be fostered.
The rule of the federal courts and of some states is that evidence
obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure must be returned
to the defendant and cannot be used against him in any way. It is
believed that only by excluding the evidence itself can the subsidiary
policy of discouraging these searches and seizures effectually be carried
out. The privilege against self-incrimination justifies an accused crimi-
nal defendant in refusing to testify at all in his case and as well au-
thorizes any witness, in any case, to refuse to answer any question the
answer to which might possibly be incriminating, i.e., be usable against
him as an admission if he were later prosecuted. The rule excluding
10 Wigmore, op. cit., supra, note 2, at §2251, thus states the policy of the privilege against
self-incrimination: "Any system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust
habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally
thereby." Why cannot this be expanded into a statement of the policy of the rules against
illegally obtained evidence and compulsory confessions as well? Can it not be said that all
three of these rules have in common the policy of protecting accused persons against
methods of prosecution which have proven distasteful to the public generally, and thereby
encouraging the proper and normal mode of prosecution which, in turn, will foster public
confidence in the administration of justice?
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confessions obtained by force, fraud, threats, promises, and fear serves
the same policy. It is a natural corollary of the self-incrimination rule"'
and as well involves a vestige of exclusion for untrustworthiness. A
forced confession is likely to be untrue and may deceive the jury.
CONCLUSION
The present article has purported merely to outline the problems
without attempting their solution. We have seen how the problems
of the law of evidence are respectively matters of the psychology
of testimony, of the psychology of jury judgments, and of the psy-
chology of certain human relations.
One consideration suggests itself in closing as to the validity of
detailed research into the correctness of the psychological assump-
tions made by the sundry rules of evidence. This is that psychology
cannot finally answer the problem of the validity of any given rule.
Psychology can give us a relative insight into how probably untrust-
worthy, or confusing, or unfavorable to the extrinsic policy, a given
item of evidence may be, but psychology cannot answer the problem
of whether evidence of such trustworthiness, or confusing effect, or
effect upon the extrinsic relation, is so untrustworthy or confusing
or destructive as to justify its being excluded or qualified.2" That is,
51 Wigmore, op. cit., supra, note 2, at §823, denies the connection between the privilege
against self-incrimination and the rule against involuntary confessions. As suggested in
the preceding footnote, the present writer is unable to agree with this. Rather it seems
that the same policy forbids with equal force (1) testimonial compulsion of an accused
or suspected person on the witness stand, (2) the non-voluntary furnishing of evidence
implicit in the "third degree", promises of immunity, or threats of punishment, and (3) the
forcible obtention of evidence by the physical force which occurs when a serious constitu-
tional policy against search and seizure is violated. The same policy underlies the three
rules. What is forbidden in each case is the obtention of evidence against the will of the
suspected person. While there is a vestige of untrustworthiness in a forced confession,
yet is not the major reason for the exclusion of confessions obtained involuntarily the
policy of punishing the prosecuting official for his misconduct in order to deter future ones
from doing the same thing. If untrustworthiness be the sole rationale, why do we not as
well exclude forced admissions obtained by private citizens? The fact that the exclusionary
rules for confessions and illegally obtained evidence are limited to evidence obtained in
an undesirable manner by officials of the very court indicates that the objective is to have
effect on the functioning of these officials and not to debar untrustworthy evidence for
that reason alone.
0 The following statement by one of the authors of the Hutchins-Slesinger series of
articles, supra, note 1, seems to state the major obstacle to the usability of extra-legal
materials in the law of evidence: "The fact was that though the social scientists seemed
to have a great deal of information, we could not see and they could not tell us how to
use it. For example, the law of evidence Is obviously full of assumptions about how people
behave. We understood that the psychologists knew how people behave. We hoped to dis-
cover whether an evidence case was 'sound' by finding out whether the decision was in
harmony with psychological doctrine. What we actually discovered was that psychology
had dealt with very few of the points raised by the law of evidence; and that the basic
psychological problem of the law of evidence, what will affect juries, and in what way,
was one psychology had never touched at all. Thus psychologists could teach you that
the rule on spontaneous exclamations was based on false notions about the truth com-
pelling qualities of a blow on the head. They could not say that the evidence should be
excluded for that reason. They did not know enough about juries to tell you that; nor
could they suggest any method of finding out enough about juries to give you an answer to
the question." Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student (1934) 1 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 511, 513.
The present writer feels that there is implicit in this a too-dismal view of the utility
of extra-legal materials in the law of evidence. Should we not use the extra-legal materials
for what they are worth, the while realizing their limitations?
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in the last analysis, a matter of human hunch as to what to do with
evidence which does possess some unfavorable qualities but the exact
degree of which qualities cannot, human knowledge being what it now
is, exactly be ascertained.
And, for that matter, even if the applicable psychology did possess
the general power of solving finally the problems of the rules, it is
apparent that in large areas of the law of evidence the psychological
principles are vague or bear but lightly on the legal problem. Thus,
under the rules of trustworthiness we see that the omnipresent psy-
chological consideration is that of the general inferiority of testimonial
evidence. This is an obvious proposition for which psychology can
do but little. It is the motif of any treatment of real evidence, and of
the topics of perception, recollection, and narration. The best evi-
dence rule preferring documentary originals is but a recognition of
the superiority of real over testimonial evidence. The hearsay rule
itself is but a logical development of the combined requirements of
perception, recollection, and narration and the conditioning devices.
The topic of hearsay rule inapplicable is but a logical problem of what
is testimony and what is not. Hearsay rule satisfied is but a matter of
when expediency dictates dispensing with some of the conditioning
devices. The hearsay exceptions, as better analyzed in terms of in-
trinsic superiority rather than positive stimulus, involve nothing more
than a recognition of superior situations for perception, recollection,
and narration, as does the preferential rule for attesting witnesses.
There are left the conditioning devices, raising the psychological prob-
lem of the fear stimulus to trustworthiness; the opinion rule and rule
for verbal completeness, with their question of meaning; and the rule
against leading questions, bottomed on the suggestion phenomenon.
Motivation is presented in the rules of corroboration and the surviving
vestiges of the interest disqualification and in certain qualities usable
for impeachment. The exclusionary rules for atheists, mental defec-
tives, and children are but logical corollaries of the oath requirement
and of the requirement of perception and recollection. These present
but little in the way of additional psychological problems.
The rules of confusion and of extrinsic policy do, of course, have
definite psychological implications and probably as diverse ones as the
rules of trustworthiness, common understanding to the contrary not-
withstanding. In these areas, however, the major problem is that of
"is it worth it?"
But even if the ultimate problem of the validity of the rules of
evidence be that of a judgment as to whether the end justifies the
means, it is submitted that the making of this judgment is a more
intelligent process if it be oriented by thinking of the matter in terms
of the applicable psychology.
Thus we see the true significance of the extra-legal psychological
materials in the law of evidence. They can be used to test out the
basic assumptions apparently made by the judicial or legislative makers
of the rules. They cannot with scientific accuracy convince us finally
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that any given rule is either exactly right or exactly wrong. This
incapability, however, does not prevent their having some utility.
They have utility for discussing the rules of evidence in terms
of human demands concerning litigation, viz., demands for efficient
jury verdicts and for protecting certain extrinsic interests. They can
be useful as materials of persuasion in arguing law to judges to induce
decision, or in arguing for legislative change. The materials should be
usable as materials of rationalization by the judges in writing their
opinions. Pending the adoption of these materials by the judicial and
legislative estates they are immediately available for improving the
efficiency of the juridical process of teaching, writing, and studying.
The present writer has found the instant outline of the subject a
convenient one for teaching the law of evidence. He feels that a dis-
cussion of the legal materials in terms of the instant outline, of the
psychological problems subsumed thereunder, and of such relevant
psychological materials as an instructor may be able to command,
leads to more efficient learning of the legal materials by making them
more meaningful. These same considerations should make for improve-
ment in writing the law of evidence.
Thus the extra-legal materials have immediate utility in teaching
and writing and have potential utility in persuading, making, and
rationalizing judicial decision and legislation concerned with the law
of evidence.
